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BRIEF OF INTERVENOR
INTRODUCTION
Alan V. Funk, the Receiver appointed over the 49th Street Galleria, and an
intervening party in the above-entitled action (the "Receiver"), hereby respectfully submits
his Brief of Intervenor.
JURISDICTION
1 lie I Jtah Cc i n I: c f Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pi n si la lit to I Jtah Code
§78-2-2(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
L

Whether the obligation to collect and remit sales tax extends to the activities

of roller skating, laser tag and batting cages?
II.

Whethe

i finding t!

nller skating, laser tag and batting cage receipts

are subject to sales tax, is the method of collection by the Utah State Tax Commission
^inl.ilh

u l Ilk 1 tin*, ifi'HM n'ss < 1111is*. Jilt! l l i e e q u a l j i i i i l t i tioiiii r l a i i s e iiiil tlliir I llli A n u M u l i n u i t

of the U.S. Constitution?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1, in pertinent part:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

1

Utah Code Annotated §59-12-103(l)1, in pertinent part:
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for the
following:
(f) admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or
recreation, including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and
other similar accommodations.
Utah Admin. Code Rule R865-19-33S, in pertinent part:
A. "Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into a place. Admission
includes the amount paid for the right to use a reserved seat or any seat in an
auditorium, theatre, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, meeting house, or
gymnasium to view any type of entertainment. Admission also includes the
right to use a table at a night club, hotel, or roof garden whether such charge
is designated as a cover charge, minimum charge, or any such similar charge.
Utah Admin. Code Rule R865-19-34S, in pertinent part:
A. The phrase "place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation" is broad
in meaning but conveys the basic idea of a definite location.
B. The amount paid for admission to such a place is subject to the tax, even
though such charge includes the right of the purchaser to participate in some
activity within the place. For example, the sale of a ticket for a ride upon a
mechanical or self-operated device is an admission to a place of amusement.
C. Charges for admissions to swimming pools, skating rinks, and other places
of amusement are subject to the tax. Charges for towel rentals, swimming suit
rentals, skate rentals, etc., are also subject to tax.
STATEMENT OF CASE
In the spring of 1984, The 49th Street Galleria (the "Galleria") opened for business
in Murray City, Utah.

*A11 future references are to the Utah Code Annotated (1992) unless otherwise
identified.
2

The Galleria initially offered bowling, roller skating, miniature golf, baseball pitching
machines, video games and food stations.
Admission to the Galleria is free with charges being imposed for each of the activities
in which a patron desires to participate. Additionally, patrons of the Galleria are free to
use without charge, numerous tables, chairs and benches located throughout the Galleria.
In the spring of 1984, the Galleria requested the Audit Division of the Utah State
Tax Commission (the "Tax Commission") to make a determination of whether the planned
recreational activities would be subject to Utah Sales Tax.
In May of 1984, Kenneth Cook of the Tax Commission informed the Galleria that
receipts from the batting cages and roller skating would be subject to Utah Sales Tax.
Believing the previous determination was inaccurate and/or poorly reasoned, the
Galleria requested an additional review of its operations by the Tax Commission.
On August 2, 1984, George M. Loertscher, Office Auditor of the Tax Commission,
informed the Galleria that the batting cages, miniature golfing, roller skating, bowling and
speed pitching (radar gun) were not subject to sales tax, however the rental of equipment
was subject to such tax.
Believing this information to be the definitive word, the Galleria did not collect sales
tax on any of the activities identified in Loertscher's letter.
At the request of the Galleria, the Tax Commission requested the Attorney General's
office to prepare an opinion regarding the application of sales tax to the Galleria's activities.
3

An "Informal Opinion" was prepared by the Attorney General's office in September,
1985. The conclusions of the report were unfavorable to the Tax Commission's current
methods of imposition and collection of sales tax and the Tax Commission requested the
Attorney General's office to reconsider the matter. Thereafter, no formal opinion was
prepared or released.
Subsequent to its opening, the Galleria added a laser chase game to its activities
portfolio.
Based on Loertscher's letter that no other activities in the Galleria were subject to
sales tax, the Galleria reasonably believed that the laser chase game was also not subject
to sales tax.
In late 1989 or early 1990, the Tax Commission audited the Galleria and assessed
additional sales tax on the Galleria's receipts from its batting cages, amusement rides, roller
skating rink, laser chase game and food sales.
The Galleria has appealed the Tax Commission's determination that receipts from
its batting cages, roller skating rink and laser chase game are subject to Utah Sales Tax.
Having exhausted its administrative remedies, the Galleria now appeals the Tax
Commission's determination to this Court.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Based upon: (a) the time in which the statute was passed, (b) the context in which
the word "including" is used, (c) the use of the word "including" in other statutes and (d) well
4

established guidelines of statutory interpretation, the 1933 Utah Legislature used "including"
in the statute as a word of limitation and only admissions to activities involving the use of
seats and tables are subject to sales tax.
Additionally, the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment is violated since
similar activities are treated differently without any justification.
Finally, the due process clause of the 14th Amendment is violated since the
application of the statute is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. The collection of sales
tax from only some of the class allegedly subject to sales tax, eviscerates the objective of the
tax raising statute.
ARGUMENT DETAIL
I.

THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED "INCLUDING" AS LIMITING THE
SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES UPON WHICH SALES TAX IS IMPOSED
The statute provides that receipts from "admission to any place of amusement,

entertainment, or recreation, including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other
similar accommodations" shall be subject to sales tax. Whether receipts from Galleria
activities are subject to sales tax depends upon whether the 1933 Legislature used the word
"including" as a word of enlargement or a word of limitation. The 1933 Utah Legislature
used "including" as a word of limitation based upon: (a) the time in which the statute was
passed, (b) the context in which the word "including" is used, (c) the use of the word
"including" in other statutes and (d) well established guidelines of statutory interpretation.

5

A.

The 1933 Legislature Enumerated All Activities Intended to be Subject to
Sales Tax,

In 1933 when the legislature passed the sales tax provision at issue, most if not all
places of "amusement, entertainment, or recreation" involved the use of seats, tables or
accommodations similar to seats and tables. Most entertainment consisted of sporting
events, the theater or motion pictures. While Utah is a state in which many of its residents
believe prophets reside, its politicians have never been held in such high regard. The 1933
Legislature could not foresee the day of laser tag, batting cages, miniature golf, video games,
speed pitching (radar guns) and the like. The legislature intended to impose sales tax on
the activities with which they were familiar; movies, the theater and sporting events.
B.

The Context in which "Including* is Used Suggests it is a Word of Limitation,

The Receiver acknowledges that the word "including" can be used as a word of
enlargement or as a work of limitation. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in State v.
Montello Salt Co., 98 P. 549, 551 (1908), revU 221 U.S. 452 (1911):
The word "including" is susceptible of different shades of
meaning. Common usage has given it different meaning. It
may be used in the sense to comprise or embrace, as this
volume includes all his works . . .; to confine or to contain, as
the shell of a nut includes the kernel . . .; to express the idea
that a thing in question constitutes a part only of the contents
of some other thing . . .; as a word of enlargement, and in
ordinary signification implying that something else has been
given beyond the general language which precedes it...; to add
to the general clause a species which does not naturally belong
to i t . . . ; and as the equivalent of "also"....

6

The subsequent reversal of the Utah court in this case resulted from the Utah court's
belief that "including" was used as a word of enlargement while the U.S. Supreme Court
found that "including" was used as a word of limitation. Both the Utah and U.S. Supreme
Courts have stated that "including" has many meanings including one of limitation. In
general usage, when "including" is used as a term of enlargement, it will be followed by a
series of enumerated items. However, in the statute, the only item listed as subject to sales
tax is admissions requiring the use of "seats and tables" and accommodations similar thereto.
Therefore, the legislature has used the term "including" as a word of limitation, not
enlargement.
C.

The Use of "Including" as a Word of Enlargement in Other Statutes Suggests
it is not a Word of Enlargement in This Case,

The statute imposing sales tax on admissions to "amusements, entertainment, or
recreation" has been revised at least 23 times by subsequent legislatures. Certainly, there
has been ample opportunity for subsequent legislatures to clear up any ambiguity regarding
the use of "including" if they had so chosen. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that the
legislature understands how to clearly use the word "including" as a word of enlargement.2

2

The Receiver conducted a Lexis search to determine the frequency which the phrase
"including, but not limited to" has been used in the Utah Code Annotated. Such search
identified 284 references to such a phrase. Additionally, to determine that these references
were to current statutory law and not merely referenced in the annotations, the Receiver
reviewed the first twenty citations. Nineteen of the first twenty citations referenced this
term "including but not limited to" in the body of the statute. Thus, 95%, or approximately
270 times, the Legislature has used "including" as a term of enlargement. Having failed to
7

In fact, Title 59 of the Utah Code governing revenue and taxation, including sales tax,
contains at least two references to the phrase "including but not limited to." See §59-21202(6) and §59-18-105(1). Having never elected to revise the statute to expand its
application while obviously knowing how to remove any ambiguity regarding "including," is
further support for finding the legislature knowingly used "including" as a word of limitation.
D.

Statutory Interpretation Requires a Finding that "Including" is a Word of
Limitation,

It is well-settled law that ambiguous taxing statutes must be construed in favor of the
taxpayer. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gould v. Gould. 245 U.S. 151, 153
(1917):
In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the
established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication,
beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge
their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically
pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly
against the government, and in favor of the citizen. (Citations
omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
The Tax Commission's own correspondence admits to the ambiguity of which
activities are subject to sales tax. On August 7, 1986, Jim Rogers, Director of the Auditing
Division wrote a memorandum to Clyde R. Nichols, Executive Director (the
"Memorandum"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." The Memorandum
begins:

do so in the sales tax statute suggests its use is one of limitation.
8

The Auditing Division has for quite some time had some
questions about which activities come under the definition of
admission. Therefore, in December 1984 we asked the
Commission to ask the Attorney General's Office to clarify the
issue.3
Applying the test as stated in Gould, this Court should construe the ambiguous
statute in favor of the taxpayers and hold that the use of "including" was intended as a word
of limitation. See also Sutherland Stat. Const. §66.01 (4th ed.)
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should hold that the 1933 Legislature used the
word "including" as a term of limitation and therefore, none of the activities conducted at
the Galleria are subject to sales tax since these activities do not involve the use of "seats and
tables . . . and other similar accommodations."
II.

APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
In the event this Court finds that the obligation to collect sales tax extends to any

activities provided at the Galleria, the Court should also find that the application of the
statute by the Tax Commission is unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause. It is hornbook law that:
The guiding principle most often stated by the courts is that the

^ e record before this Court reflects the fact that the informal opinion prepared by the
Attorney General's office was apparently suppressed once the Tax Commission determined
it would be damaging to its ability to collect sales tax based upon the arbitrary method it
was and is employing. A true and correct copy of the informal opinion is attached hereto
as Exhibit "B."
9

constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws requires
that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances
and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the
liabilities imposed.
Equal protection in its guaranty of like treatment to all similarly
situated permits classification which is reasonable and not
arbitrary and which is based upon material and substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the objects or
persons dealt with and the public purpose sought to be achieved
by the legislation involved.
16A AmJur 2d §738 (1979).
The Receiver concedes that the statute at issue is most likely constitutional on its
face and that the legislature can delegate to the Tax Commission, the power to make rules
and regulations necessary to enforce the statute subject to confines of the statute. See §5912-118. However, in the enforcement of the statute, the Tax Commission, as a subsidiary
and surrogate of the State of Utah, must enforce the statute in a non-discriminatory fashion
or risk a constitutional challenge based on violation of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Tax Commission has arbitrarily and without reasonable relation to the objective
of the tax raising statute, enforced the law against only some of the identified class. As
stated above, the law by its terms applies to "any place of amusement, entertainment, or
recreation." By its terms, the class subject to the statute would include golfing, bowling,
playing tennis or racquetball, yet all of these activities have currently been arbitrarily
excluded from collection of sales tax. However, the Tax Commission has imposed sales tax
10

on receipts from swimming, skating and amusement park rides.
Furthermore, the Tax Commission has admitted that such distinctions are arbitrary.
In its Order (a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C") the Tax
Commission states:
The Commission recognizes that distinctions between [bowling
and batting cages] are difficult to draw. The exemption of
bowling from sales tax is largely historical and perhaps would
not exist if a fresh look at the issue were possible. Even so, the
fact that receipts from bowling may have been excluded from
taxation for historical reasons does not require that receipts
from batting cages also be excluded . . . .
I d at 3.
Certainly, the exclusion of bowling or other activities from collection of sales tax
based on "historical reasons" cannot justify treating the activities differently. If this were not
so, no statutes would ever violate the equal protection clause since a "historical" justification
could always be found.
Since the statute in dispute involves an economic right, its constitutionality will
be determined by application of the lowest level of scrutiny: the "rational basis test." Under
this test, a "classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia.
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). The case in Royster involved the application of a tax against
similarly situated entities wherein the taxing authority treated the corporations differently

11

without any rational basis for such distinctions. The court concluded: "[A] discriminatory
tax law cannot be sustained against the complaint of a party aggrieved if the classification
appear to be altogether illusory."

(See also: Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.. 220

U.S. 61, 82 (1911): A statute is unconstitutional when "found to be merely arbitrary
mandates, or to discriminate invidiously between different persons in substantially the same
situation."; Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.. 455 U.S. 422, 439-42 (1982) (Blackmun, J.
concurring): "[T]he rational-basis standard is not a toothless one (citation omitted), the
classificatory scheme must rationally advance a reasonable and identifiable government
objective (citation omitted). . . . The State's rationale must be something more than the
exercise of a strained imagination; while the connection between means and ends need not
be precise, it, at the least, must have some objective basis."; Tussman & tenBroek, "The
Equal Protection of the Laws," 37 Calif.L.Rev. 341 (1941), "The measure of the
reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those
similarly situated.")
The Tax Commission has failed to articulate, nor can they, any rational basis for
taxing, for example, batting cage admissions but not racquetball admissions. The record
reflects that the Tax Commission has argued that the batting cages are taxable because a
person is "admitted" to an "enclosed area." However, an admittee to a tennis or racquetball
court is admitted to a more identifiable "enclosed area" than a participant of the batting
cage, since netting in the batting cages only protects neighboring participants from stray balls
12

but does not otherwise limit the direction of the ball. In racquetball, the participant(s) and
ball are confined to a large enclosed cube; four walls with a ceiling and floor. The exclusion
of racquetball and tennis from collection of sales tax is arbitrary and violates the Tax
Commission's own rule.

As stated in Rule R865-19-34S, a "'place of amusement,

entertainment, or recreation' is broad in meaning but conveys the basic idea of a definite
location." Additionally, a racquetball or tennis court is a more "enclosed area" than is a
skating rink or laser tag game, yet tennis and racquetball are not subject to the tax. Further,
isn't a patron of a golfing range also admitted to a specific "tee" with appropriate fencing,
netting and other barriers to protect other nearby golfers or members of the community?
Obviously, any distinctions the Tax Commission can articulate are distinctions without
substance and are therefore illusory. As stated by Justice Jackson in Railway Express
Agency v. New York. 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1948):
I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the
Federal Government must exercise their powers so as not to
discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some
reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of
regulation. This equality is not merely abstract justice. The
framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget
today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door
to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to
pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation
Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will
be just than to require that laws be equal in operation.
(Emphasis added.)
13

See also Zobel v. Williams. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
The Tax Commission can articulate no justification for treating so differently,
activities that are so similar. Failing even to pass the "rational basis test," this Court should
find that the Tax Commission's application of the statute is unconstitutional as a violation
of equal protection.
III.

APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.
The analysis required to determine the constitutionality of a statute under the due

process clause of the 14th Amendment is substantially similar to the analysis under the
equal protection clause. As stated in Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502.525 (1934): "[The]
guaranty of due process . . . demands . . . that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained."
The Tax Commission alleges that sales tax should have been collected on various
activities at the Galleria and that the Galleria was negligent in its failure to collect and
remit this tax. In the event that the Tax Commission's position is correct, a lien may be
placed on the Galleria property and eventually foreclosed on to satisfy such lien. See §59-1302. Since this finding would certainly deprive the Galleria of a substantial property
interest, the due process provisions must be satisfied.
The "rational-basis test" under the due process clause requires that a law not be

14

unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. As previously stated, the Tax Commission has
arbitrarily and without any justification, taxed certain activities within the class of
"amusement, entertainment, or recreation" (skating, swimming, batting cages and laser tag)
yet have failed to tax other similarly situated activities within the same class (bowling,
golfing, tennis and racquetball). The objective of the statute is obviously to raise additional
revenue for the State. To arbitrarily exclude some of the activities falling within the subject
class from the payment of sales tax, eviscerates that objective.

Therefore, the Tax

Commission's collection methods are unconstitutional under the due process clause of the
14th Amendment.
Additionally, the Tax Commission's collection methods are unconstitutional since the
statue and rules as applied, fail to give adequate notice of required compliance. As stated
by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Packard. 250 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1952):
[T]he test a statute must meet to be valid is: It must be
sufficiently definite (a) to inform persons of ordinary
intelligence, who would be law abiding, what their conduct must
be to conform to its requirements; (b) to advise a defendant
accused of violating it just what constitutes the offense with
which he is charged, and (c) to be susceptible of uniform
interpretation and application by those charged with the
responsibility of applying and enforcing it.
The statute fails this due process test. Reasonable people can dispute the meaning
of the phrase, "admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation, including
seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar accommodations." It was this very

15

confusion that cause the Galleria to fail to collect sales tax on the laser game. Additionally,
as discussed above, the legislature's meaning of the word "including" is at best ambiguous.
Furthermore, the Tax Commission's decision that the Galleria's bowling and miniature golf
receipts are not subject to sales tax but other similarly situated activities allegedly are
subject to such tax adds further confusion. Finally, by the Tax Commission's own admission,
they are not sure of the "interpretation and application" of the statute. As stated in the
Memorandum, "The Auditing Division has for quite some time had some questions about
which activities come under the definition of admission."
For the foregoing reasons, the statute and rules regarding the imposition, collection
and remittance of sales tax are unconstitutional as violative of the 14th Amendment's due
process clause.
CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT
The Receiver respectfully requests that this Court find that none of the activities
conducted at the Galleria are subject to the collection and payment of Utah Sales Tax.
In the alternative, if this Court should find that the activities conducted at the
Galleria are subject to Utah Sales Tax, the Receiver respectfully requests that this Court
find that the Tax Commission's methods of collection are unconstitutional.
DATED this J T ^-^dav
d a y of February, 1993.
, BURTON & THURMAN
Stephen W. Rupp
Attorneys for Intervenor
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of February, 1993, true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Intervenor was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Lavar F. Christensen, Esq.
7050 Union Park Avenue, Suite #420
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorneys for Petitioner
Rick L. Carlton, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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APPEALS Sto . .v
STATE TAX COMMiSSiOiv
M E M O R A N D U M

TO:

CLYDE R. NICHOLS, JR
Executive Director

FROM:

JIM ROGERS, Director
Auditing Division

DATE:

August 7, 1986

RE:

Taxing Admissions

The Auditing Division has for quite some time had some questions about
which activities come under the definition of an admission. Therefore, in
December 1984 we asked the Commission to ask the Attorney General's Office to
clarify this issue. We wrote up the attached request for Commissioner
Brunson. However, this is not the actual request. A copy of the final
request did not come back to the Division.
Also attached, is a copy of a draft response from the AG's Office. The
draft was prepared in September 1985 and was discussed with the Auditing
Division. The Division had some significant concerns with the draft opinion
and the AG agreed to consider these further. We have had no word from the AG
since that time.
It is important to note that the AG's draft would have a detrimental
effect on state revenues. Additionally, the draft leaves as many grey areas
in admissions as we have now.
Therefore, I am requesting that the Commission take these actions. First,
the Commission could work with the AG to get a timely and sound opinion.
Secondly, once the opinion was finalized, the Commission could rework the
present rules on admissions. Third, the Commission could include in its
legislative package any needed changes that could not be handled within the
rule.
It is important to note that an audit is being held up pending the
resolution of the question. Additionally, there are other potential audits
where this issue could be of significance.
Please let me know of any decisions on this issue. The Division would
like to be included in discussions as this problem is solved.

llllLre
cc: Kay, Reid, Ken
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September 6, 1985

Mr- Mark K. Buchi/ Chairman
Utah State Tax Commission
Heber M. Wells Office Building
160 East 3 00 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134
RE:

Attorney General Opinion No. 85-40
Taxability of Admission and Special Events Fees

Dear Mr. Buchi:
The following Informal Opinion is in response to your
letter of May 24/ 1985/ wherein you requested guidance as to the
taxation of admission fees.

This Opinion will set forth the

fundamental rules that should govern the taxation of admissions
receipts and then suggest changes in Tax Commission policy that
will provide consistent application of the law.
PACTS
In Utah/ "amount (s) paid for admission to any place of
amusement, entertainment/ or recreation" are subject to sales
tax.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(d).

Further, the definition of

"admission" states that it "includes seats and tables reserved or
otherwise, and other similar accommodations and charges made
therefore."

Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(9).

While at first blush

it appears that the application of these legislative provisions
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would be simple, problems surrounding the "admissions tax" have
burdened the Tax Commission and its staff for many years.
For example, the Tax Commission presently imposes the
admissions tax on charges made for swimming pool use, skating
rink fees, and amusement park rides*

However, golfing green

fees, receipts from bowling alleys, and court fees (tennis/
racquetball/ squash/ etc.) are not taxed.

According to the Tax

Commission/ the reason for distinguishing the above-categorized
activities is not necessarily grounded in legal reasoning;
rather, it is the result of varying practices and interpretations
of successive administrations which/ over the years/ have rooted
themselves into the policies of the Commission.

Further, the

legislative provision that defines "admission" and the Tax
Commission Rule that defines "place of amusement, entertainment,
or recreation" are nebulous and difficult to apply in practical
situations, thus adding to the confusion surrounding the
admissions tax.
The difficulty of these problems has made the
application of the admissions tax unclear in new amusement
situations such as batting cages, video arcades, and the like.
Therefore, this Opinion was requested by the Commission so that
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an understandable statement of tire law can be consistently and
correctly applied with regard to the admissions tax.
Throughout this Opinion, reference is made to the
phrase "seats and tables reserved or otherwise/ and other similar
accommodations."

For purposes of brevity, we have generically

referred to this entire quotation as "seats and tables" or
"seats/tables."

However, we imply therein that all such seats

and tables, reserved or otherwise/ and other similar
accommodations (benches, stools/ bleachers/ etc.) are included.
Likewise, we have used "amusement activity" to refer to the
phrase "place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation."
ISSUE
What are the principles and standards for determination
with respect to the admissions tax?
DISCUSSION
A.

Introduction
The "admissions tax" was promulgated as part of the

Emergency Revenue Act of 1933.

Other than changes in the taxing

rate, the language of the provision has remained substantially
the same:
paid:

"fT]here is levied and there shall be collected and

(d) A tax . • . of the amount paid for admission to any
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place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation."
Ann. S 59-15-4(d).

Utah Code

The term "admission" is legislatively defined

in Utah Code Ann. section 59-15-2(9):

"'Admission1 includes

seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar
accommodations and charges made therefore."

For the most part,

the problems which face us in applying the admissions tax stem
from the determination of what constitutes an "admission."
Since the controlling source of law in this issue is
the Utah Code's applicable provisions sections 59-15-4(d) and 5 915-2(9), the major question to be decided is whether the Utah
Legislature intended to strictly limit "admission" to only
include activities where the participant uses "seats and tables"
to enjoy "amusement, entertainment, or recreation/ or if
itemizing the use of seats and tables is merely an example of one
type of an "admission."

If the former is true, then the current

Tax Commission practice of taxing the receipts from- swimming pool
and skating rink charges is improper.

However, if the latter is

true, then the Tax Commission may be in error by not taxing some
activities that should be subject to the tax (e.g., green fees,
bowling receipts, and court fees).

B.

Analysis of Utah Statutes
Since the subject legislative provisions were handed

down as law in 1933, no written documentation of legislative
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history is available to aid in determining the legislature's
intent (written documentation begins in 1953) . Therefore, to
determine the intent of the Utah Legislature, we must apply
accepted rules of statutory construction.
The Utah Legislature's definition of "admissions"
states that "admission includes,*

As noted earlier, the question

we must resolve is whether the term "includes" should be a term
of enlargement, indicating that an "admission" could be something
else besides the charge for use of seats or tables; or whether
the tenh "includes" should be a word of limitations where an
admission could only be that situation where seats, tables, or
similar accommodations were used in order to enjoy the amusement
activity.
A majority of court holdings state that the word
"includes" is a word of expansion and enlargement and not one of
restriction or limitation. .£££, e.g. , Schwab v. Ariyoshi, 58 Haw.
25, 564 P.2d 135, (1977); Lyman v. Town of Bow Mar, 188 Colo.
216, 533 P.2d 1129, (1975); GreyhaxmA Lin^c, Xnc, v. City of
Chicago, 24 111. App.3d 718, 321 M.E. 2d 293 (1974).

Neverthe-

less, considering the context in which the word is used, it can
be and often is a word of limitation.

See, e.g., Premier

Products Co. v. Cameron, 240 Or, 123, 400 P.2d 227 (1965).
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In State v. Monticello Salt Company, 98 P. 549, 34 Dtah 458
(190 8)/ the Dtah Supreme court stated that:
The word "including/" according to common usage,
is susceptible to different shades of meaning.
It may be used in the sense to comprise or
embrace; to confine or to contain; to express
the idea that a thing in question constitutes a
part only of the contents of some other thing;
as a word of enlargement, and ordinarily implying that something else has been given beyond
the general language which precedes it; to add
to the general clause a species which does not
naturally belong to it. It is frequently used
as the equivalent of "also."
Therefore, in Dtah, the use of the word "includes" is not
apositive as to whether the term "admissions" as used in section
59-15-2(9) is exclusive or exemplary of an admission.

We must

examine the context of the usage and other factors to determine
the meaning of the word "includes."
First, the only item listed as an admission is the
charge for seats and tables, as opposed to a common usage of
"includes" as a term of enlargement where a list of several items
are given as an example of what the term means.

Second, we

should note that the phrase "and other similar accommodations" is
modifying the nouns seats or tables and not modifying the term
"admission" itself, which would indicate that "includes" was used
as a term of enlargement.

Third, nowhere in the definition is it
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stated that the term includes seats or tables, but is not limited
to charges for seats and tables-

Fourth, had the legislature

intended that the term "admission" would mean something more than
the charge for seats and tables, it could have easily stated
otherwise.

Finally, considering the time when the definition of

"admission" and the admission tax itself were promulgated, using
the common base of seats and tables as the standard for
determining whether an activity was an admission was likely
reasonable.

Video arcades, batting cages, public golf courses,

etc., were non-existent in 1933.

The major source of amusement

and entertainment was the theater, picture shows, and sporting
events.

Defining admission as a charge made for seats and

tables, therefore, was adequate.
These factors indicate that the term "includes" should
be a term of limitations and the Utah Legislature's intent was to
limit the admissions tax applicability to only those activities
wherein seats and tables were necessary to the enjoyment of the
amusement activity.
Moreover, one of the most well-established rules of
statutory construction with regard to taxing statutes is that the
rule of strict construction must be applied against the taxing
authority and in favor of the taxpayer.

Therefore, taxing
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statutes will not be extended beyond the clear and reasonable
interpretation of their language and if a taxing statute is of
doubtful intent^ it must be construed favorable to the taxpayer.
Sutherland Stat. Const. § 66.01 (4th Ed.).

This rule of

statutory construction is clearly applicable to the Utah
Legislative provision section 59-15-4(d) which taxes admission

Additionally, the very Tax Commission Rule (S33) that
interprets the statutory definition of "admission" limits its
substantive content and list of examples to those situations
which are only covered by a strictly construed intrepretation of
"admission":
a. The term "admission" means the right or
privilege to enter into a place including seats
and tables reserved or otherwise and.other
similar accommodations and charges made therefor. The amount paid for the right to use a
reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium,
theater, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, meeting
house or gymnasium to view any type of entertainment is taxable. The right to use a table
at a night club, hotel or roof garden is taxable
whether such charge is designated as a cover
charge .or any such similar charge, and the
amount paid for such right is subject to the
tax. This is true whether the charge made for
the use of the seat, table, or similar accommodation is combined with an Admission charge
proper to form a single charge, or is separate
and distinct from an admission charge, or is
itself the sole charge.

Hark K. Buchi
September 6, 1985
Page Nine

Informal Opinion No. 85-40

This Sales Tax Rule implies no application of the
admissions tax to amusement activities whose fee is for other
than the use of seats and tables.
Therefore, considering all of the above factors, it is
the opinion of the Dtah Attorney General that the term
"admission," as defined by the Dtah Legislature, is strictly
limited to those situations where seats, tables/ or similar
seating facilities are used by the patrons to engage in the
amusement activity.

To be subject to the admissions tax of

section 59-15-4(d)/ the definition/ as above construed/ must be
satisfied.
C.

Application to Current Practice
Construing the definition of "admission" to be limited

to the charge made for use of seats/ tables/ etc., will require
that the Tax Commission change some of its present taxing
policies with regard to the admissions tax.

Subjecting any

activity to the admissions tax which does not require the use of
some type of seating facility is not in accord with the
restrictive definition of "admission."

If the fee charged is not:

an "admission" as that term is defined bv section 59-15-2(9) and
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interpreted by this Opinion/ then neither can it be an "admission
to a place of amusement/ entertainment or recreation."
The charge paid for use of a seat or table at a
theater, movier stadium, gymnasium, schoolhouse, nightclub, and
other similar places is clearly subject to the admissions tax
Also, the price paid to ride on amusement devices located at
amusement parks, carnivals or fairs is taxable (this is true
whether the price paid is for an individual rid or unlimited
use) , as is the cost of a ski lift ticket.
However, participation in activities such as golf,
bowling, swimming, skating, tennis, racquetball, etc., cannot be
taxed by section 5 9-15-4(d) since they fail to meet the
definition of "admission" in that the fee paid to participate in
this type of recreation is not for the use of any seat or table.
Incidental use of a seat or table may occur, but fee paid for
these activities is primarily for use of the facilities. To
comport with the statutory definition of "admission," the use of
seats or tables must be necessary or customary in order to view
the amusement, entertainment, or recreation.
In situations where the use of a seat and/or table is
only partial, the Tax Commission will need to determine whether
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the use of the seat/table is incidental or necessary to enjoyment
of the activity*

If the use is incidental/ then the admissions

tax will not apply; if the use is necessary, then the admissions
tax will apply.
Therefore, the restrictive term "admission" will
continue to tax many of the same activities, but will require
that the Tax Commission alter its taxing policies where they have
been imposing the admissions tax on certain participative
activities (e.g., swimming and skating).
D.

Practical Considerations
This Opinion has set forth what we believe the proper

statement of the law in Utah is, according to Otah statute, with
respect to the admissions tax of Utah Code Ann. section 5 9-154(d) and 59-15-2(9).

However, because of the unusual manner in

which the definition of "admission" was written and the rules of
statutory construction which control/ our interpretation is
narrow and, therefore/ does not tax the large spectrum of
"admission fees" that for all practical reasons should be subject
to the tax.

The present standards for determination of the

admissions tax,

though they be the standards we must apply, are

simply inadequate today.
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Common sense tells us that the price which a patron
pays to go swimming, skating golfing, bowling, and a host of
other charges, should logically be subject to the admissions tax.
This notion is present in Attorney General Opinion No. 78-259
wherein Assistant Attorney General Hark Buchi stated that it was
the duty of a state municipality to "collect a sales tax on the
admission price to the swimming pool golf curse and any other
city-owned recreation facilities.*

This conclusion seemed so

clear that, other than applying section 59-15-4(d) and the Sales
Tax Regulations, no detailed analysis was done.
Further, the Tax Commission passed a Sales Tax Rule
(S47) which states that "Eclharges imposed on persons admitted to
swimming pools, skating rinks and other places of amusement are
subject to tax."

Also, in defining what the phrase "place of

amusement, entertainment, or recreation" means, the Commission
said in Sales Tax Rule S34 that "[tlhe amount paid for admission
to such a place is subject to the tax even though such charge
includes the right of the purchaser to participate in some
activity within the place."

These actions on the part of the Tax

Commission indicate that, even though hesitant about taking the
admissions tax into all participative activities, limiting the
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tax to only those situations where seats/tables are needed is an
arbitrary and unfair segregation of amusement and recreational
activitiesWe are not the only state that has had to relegate
itself to applying a narrowly-written admissions tax.

In Graiier

v. Director of Revenue, 193 Kan. 605, 396 P.2d 260 (1964), the
Kansas Supreme Court refused to impose the Kansas admissions tax
on bowling alley receipts where the tax was levied against "the
sale of admissions to any place of amusement/ entertainment, or
recreation."

The Kansas statutes gave no definition of the term

"admission/" so the court adopted a standard dictionary
definition stating that "admission" meant "3a:
admitting:

the fact of being admitted:

enter . . . .

4:

price of entrance:

an act of

permission or right to
fee paid at or for

entering."
In response to the argument of the Kansas Attorney
General that the tax should also apply to the price charged for
participation in the recreation of bowling, the court held that
the charge for participation was not the same as a charge for
entrance to a place:
[W]hat the legislature taxed . . . was the
price of admission to enter a place of amusement, entertainment or recreation. Had the

0 0 0 0 0 1 K/i
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legislature by its enactment intended to
impose a tax on charges for participation in
such activities as bowling, it could have
easily done so. The fact that it did not do
so is persuasive that it was not the intention
of the legislature to impose a tax on charges
made for participation in the recreational
activities.
id- at p. 264 (emphasis in original)-.

The Utah Legislature's

definition of "admission" is even more limiting than the
dictionary definition adopted in Grauer, since the Grauer
standard of "fee for entrance" is even broader than Utah's "fee
for use of seats/tables."
The resolution of this tangled problem is to either:
1.

redefine the term "admission" (section 59-15-2(9)) to include

a standard meaning "price paid for entrance," as in Grauer and to
include therein "the price paid to participate in the amusement,
entertainment, or recreational activity"; or 2.

to specifically

identify in section 59-15-4 (d) the activities to be covered by
the tax, stating that the list is not exclusive but exemplary.
Either of these approaches will provide a fair, understandable,
and workable statute.
However, for the time being we must suffer with the
present: definition of "admission" as it is found in section 59-
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The customs and practices of society changef but

unfortunately statutes are often not updated and revised to keep
up with those changes. Neither the Tax Commission or the
Attorney General's Office has the authority to ignore the laws of
this state and tax activities beyond the scope of those laws.
The proper remedy of this dilemma must be left to the Utah
Legislature.
CONCLUSION
As defined in Utah Code Ann. section 5 9-15-2(9), the
term "admission* is strictly inclusive only of a charge for the
use of seats, tables or other similar accommodations.

Unless the

"admission fee" is for this use, the admissions tax of section
59-15-4 (d) cannot be imposed.

Further, to engage in or enjoy the

amusement activity, it must be customary or necessary to use
seats, tables or other similar accommodations.
Currently, the Tax Commission is imposing the
admissions tax on the charges paid to enter a swimming pool or
skating rink.

The imposition of the admissions tax on these

charges goes beyond the taxing authority granted by section 5 915-4(d), since the charges do not meet the definition of
"admission" as described above.
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This Opinion recognizes that the definition of
"admission" which we must apply is inadequate and does not tax
many activities that should fall within the admissions tax.
Confusion^ inconsistency, and arbitrary distinctions are the
result of applying this definition.

Nevertheless/ the Tax

Commission/ like the Attorney Generalfs Office/ is bound by the
provisions of the Dtah codef specifically/ section 59-15-2(9)
with respect to the admissions tax.

We cannot ignore/ change or

exercise authority beyond what that section allows.
Therefore, the definition of "admission" is restricted
to include only the charge imposed for the use of seats, tables
or other similar accommodations

Unless a fee meets this

definition/ the admissions tax of Utah Code Ann. section 59-154(d) is not applicable.

If the Dtah Legislature desires, it may

revise that definition to be more inclusive of present
activities.
Sincerely,

Bryce H. Pettey
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Div.
BHP/rrm
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
THE 49TH STREET GALLERIA,
Petitioner,

ORDER

v.
Appeal No. 90-1055

AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

Account No. D149 26
Respondent.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
upon a Petition for Reconsideration, da'ced December 10, 1991, filed
by the Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final decision
dated November 20, 1991.
FINDINGS
i.
a

Petition

Utah Administrative Rule R86l-1-5A(P) provides that
for

Reconsideration

M

will

allege

as

grounds

for

reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery
of new evidence.M

Under this rule, the Tax Commission may exercise

its

in

discretion

Reconsideration.
Reconsideration

granting

or

denying

a

Petition

for

The points raised in Petitioner's Petition for
are

discussed

below, in the

order

of

their

presentation.
2.

Petitioner argues that because it was advised by

Audit Division staff that several of its other activities were not
subject to sales tax, Petitioner was justified in concluding that

ATTACHMENT 2
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its laser chase game was also not taxable.

Petitioner's argument

overlooks the fact that it had also been advised by others on the
Audit Division staff that its activities were subject to sales tax.
Petitioner chose to accept the advice to its liking and reject the
contrary advice.

Then, without further discussion of the matter

with Audit Division stafff Petitioner concluded that the laser
chase game was also not subject to tax. The laser chase game had
not

existed

when

Audit

Division

staff

initially

reviewed

Petitioner's operation.
In its previous Order, the Commission waived retroactive
application

of

sales

tax

to

those specific

activities

where

Petitioner received conflicting advice from different members of
Audit Division staff.

Petitioner did not receive conflicting

advice regarding the taxability of the laser chase game.

The

Commission therefore reaffirms its decision that the laser chase
game is subject to sales tax.
3.

Petitioner also contends the Commission did not

respond to its challenge to the administration rules under which
sales tax was imposed on Petitioner's various activities.

In

effect, Petitioner argues that such rules exceed the scope of
Utah's Sales Tax Act.

The Commission recognizes that payment of

sales tax cannot be required other than as authorized by the Sales
Tax Act. However, the Commission is authorized to prescribe rules
in conformity with the Act to ascertain and assess the tax imposed
-2-
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by the Act.

(See Utah Code Ann. §59-12-118.) The rules upon which

the assessment was made in this case are an application of the
foregoing rulemaking authority. The rules themselves have remained
unchanged for many years, with no legislative direction to the
contrary.

The Commission therefore finds no merit in Petition's

challenge to those rules.
4.

Petitioner contends that §59-12-103(1)(f) of the

Sales Tax Act and the administrative rules pertaining to that
portion of the Act are unconstitutionally vague.

Petitioner has

framed its objections in conclusionary language, with no citation
of authority and minimal analysis.
rejects

Petition's

challenge

The Commission therefore

uo the constitutionality

of the

statute and rules.
5. Petitioner further argues that no logical distinction
can be drawn between bowling, which is not subject to sales tax,
and batting cages, which are subject to tax.
recognizes

that distinctions

difficult tc draw.

between

the

The Commission

two activities

are

The exemption of bowling from sales tax is

largely historical and perhaps would not exist if a fresh look at
the issue were possible.

Even so, the fact that receipts from

bowling may have been excluded from taxation for historical reasons
does not require that receipts from batting cages also be excluded,
where such receipts are otherwise subject to sales tax under the
Sales Tax Act.
-3-
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6.

The Petitioner also contends that it has overpaid

other sales taxes and is therefore entitled to an offset against
the sales tax liability imposed by the audit which is the subject
of this appeal.

The Petitioner did not pursue such a position

during the hearing in this matter, nor has any specific claim for
refund been submitted.

Petitioner may claim such a refund in the

manner provided by law and regulation.
7.

Finally, the Commission must correct Petitioner's

misstatements regarding a draft informal opinion prepared during
1985 by an Assistant Utah Attorney General.

Petitioner contends

the Commission concealed the opinion because it was favorable to
Petitioner's position.

First, the so called opinion is merely a

draft that was never signed, never approved by the Attorney General
and never accepted by the Commission.

Second, the Commission has

made no effort to conceal the draft. The Petitioner has a copy of
the draft, which has been made a part of the record in this matter.
The draft is not binding on the Commission, and the Commission has
rejected its conclusions for the reasons stated in the Commission's
original decision.
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DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order of
the Utah State Tax Commission that the Petition for Reconsideration
is denied.

It is so ordered.
DATED this

f/y

day of 'fflfo/t/CA-*'

/ 199 2.

/

DER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

*6^
n

sO"fhlAiMlMS^
B. Pacheco
Commi s s ioner

/

S.
Willes
S. Blaine
Bla
Commissioner

NOTICE: Ycu have thirty (30) days after the date of final order to
file in Supreme Court a petition for judicial review. Utah Code
Ann. §§63-465-13(1), 63-46b-14 (2) (a) .
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
49th Street Galleria
c/o LaVar Christensen
4998 South 360 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84123
Craig Sandberg
Assistant Director, Auditing
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84134
James H. Rogers
Director, Auditing Div.
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84134
Rick Carlton
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this

/ ^

day of "x^C->^A

, 1992.

&rts2<7?-K

Secretaj
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